Both noncooperative and cooperative game theory have been applied to business strategy. We propose a hybrid noncooperative-cooperative game model, which we call a biform game. This is designed to formalize the notion of business strategy as making moves to try to shape the competitive environment in a favorable way. (The noncooperative component of a biform game models the strategic moves. The cooperative component models the resulting competitive environment.) We give biform models of various well-known business strategies. We prove general results on when a business strategy, modelled as a biform game, will be efficient. *
Introduction
There have been a number of applications of game theory to the field of business strategy in recent years. Reflecting the two branches of game theory itself-the so-called noncooperative and cooperative branches-these applications have taken two forms. Noncooperative applications, which are the more numerous, use the more familiar language of game matrices and trees. A leading recent example of this approach is Ghemawat [8, 1997] . Cooperative applications use the less familiar characteristic-function language, and to date have been much fewer in number. For this approach, see Brandenburger and Stuart [5, 1996] , Lippman and Rumelt [13, 2003b] (also their [12, 2003a] ), MacDonald and Ryall [14, 2002] , [15, 2004] , Oster [19, 1999] , Spulber [27, 2004] , and Stuart [29, 2001 ].
The two approaches address different questions. The noncooperative model is useful for analyzing strategic moves in business-say the decision whether to enter a market, where to position a product, what brand to build, how much capacity to install, or how much money to devote to R&D. The cooperative model is useful for addressing the basic question of how much power the different players-firms, suppliers, customers, etc.-have in a given setting.
Both models have a role to play in understanding business strategy. In a cooperative game, no player is given any price-setting power a priori, and all players are active negotiators.
Buyers compete for sellers and sellers compete for buyers, without any specific 'protocol.' 1 This direct analysis of the power of the different players in the marketplace has been basic to the business-strategy field, going back at least to the Five Forces framework (Porter [21, 1980] ). One can see the Five Forces-and other related frameworks which we mention lateras a tool for assessing how much value is created in a certain environment, and how that 'pie' is divided up among the players. (It is notable that these frameworks embody a 'freeform' view of competition. One reason is empirical. For example, in business-to-business relationships-such as supplier to firm, and firm to distributor-prices and other terms are often negotiated rather than posted by one or another party.)
Cooperative theory, then, offers a model of the competitive environment. 2 But this is 1 The term is from Kreps [11, 1990, pp.92-95] . 2 We remind the reader that, though standard, the terms "non-cooperative" and "cooperative" game theory are perhaps unfortunate. In particular, cooperative theory can indeed be used to analyze the implications of competition among the players.
only the starting point for business strategy. The next step is to find ways to shape the environment in a favorable way. A good strategic move is one that brings about favorable economics to a player-one that enables the player to capture more value. This is where the noncooperative theory is important, since it gives us a formal language in which to write down such strategic moves (and countermoves).
In this paper, we put the two models together to create a hybrid noncooperative-cooperative model which we call the biform 3 game model. A biform game is a two-stage game. The first stage is noncooperative and is designed to describe the strategic moves of the players.
(These might be entry, position, brand, capacity, R&D, etc. as above. More broadly, we can think of the players' first-stage moves as building their various "strategic capabilities." 4 ) But the consequences of these moves aren't payoffs (at least not directly). Instead, each profile of strategic choices at the first stage leads to a second-stage, cooperative game. This gives the competitive environment created by the choices that the players made in the first stage. Analysis of the second stage then tells us how much value each player will capture (i.e., gives us the payoffs of the players). In this way, the biform model is precisely a formalization of the idea that business strategies shape the competitive environment-and thereby the fortunes of the players. See Figure 1 .1 for a schematic of a biform game. We note that at the colloquial level, phrases such as "changing the game" or "choosing the game" are often used when conveying the idea of business strategy. The biform model fits with this language: In the first stage, the players are each trying to choose the best game for themselves, where by "game" is meant the subsequent (second-stage) game of value.
Equally, they are trying to change the game, if we define one of the second-stage games as the status quo. 3 Having, or partaking of, two distinct forms (OED, 2nd edition). 4 We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this wording.
Examples
We now give two examples of biform games. (More examples can be found in Section 5.) Example 2.1 (A Branded Ingredient Game) We start with a biform analysis of the idea of a 'branded-ingredient' strategy. 5 In the game, there are two firms each able to produce a single unit of a certain product. There is one supplier, which can supply the necessary input to at most one firm, at a cost of $1. There are numerous buyers, each interested in buying a single unit of the product from one of the two firms. Every buyer has a willingness-to-pay of $9 for firm 1's product, and a willingness-to-pay of $3 for firm 2's product.
The supplier has the option of incurring an upfront cost of $1 to increase the buyers' willingness-to-pay for firm 2's product to $7. This is the branded-ingredient strategy, under which the supplier puts its logo on its customers' products. (To make our point most clearly, we assume that this does not affect the buyers' willingness-to-pay for firm 1, the stronger firm.)
Status quo
Brandedingredient strategy $1 Firm 1 Supplier well-known instance of a branded-ingredient strategy is the Intel Inside campaign. See Botticelli, Collis, and Pisano [4, 1997] for an account; also Footnote 8 below. vice versa for the right bar. The interpretation of the bars at the lower endpoint is similar.
(We don't show the upfront cost here, but it's included in the numbers below.) How will this game be played? To see, we start by analyzing each of the cooperative games, and then work back to find the optimal strategy for the supplier. Formally, we'll analyze cooperative games using the Core, a solution concept that embodies competition among the players (see Section 4 below). The Cores in the current example are as follows. 6 In the status-quo game, a total of $9 − $1 = $8 of value will be created. Firm 2 and the buyers won't capture any value. The supplier will receive between $2 and $8, and firm 1 will receive between $0 and $6 (where the sum of what the supplier and firm 2 get must be $8).
This is, of course, the intuitive answer: Competition among buyers ensures that the firms can get their full willingness-to-pay. Firm 2 can then bid up to $3 for the input from the supplier. Firm 1 has an advantage over firm 2 (since it commands the higher willingnessto-pay) and so will be the one to secure the input. But because of the presence of firm 2, it will have to pay at least $3 for it. Thus the supplier gets a minimum of $3 − $1 = $2 of value, and the remaining $9 − $3 = $6 is subject to negotiation between the supplier and firm 1, and this could be split in any way.
The analysis of the branded-ingredient game is very similar: $8 of value will be created gross of the $1 upfront cost, or $7 net. Again, firm 2 and the buyers won't capture any value. This time, the supplier is guaranteed $5, and the remaining $2 of value will be split somehow between the supplier and firm 1.
We see that paying $1 to play the branded-ingredient strategy may well be worthwhile for the supplier. For example, if the supplier is cautious about how the 'residual pies' will get divided between it and firm 1, then it will prefer the guaranteed $5 in the bottom game to the guaranteed $2 in the top game.
The 'aha' of the strategy is that it wouldn't be worthwhile for firm 2 to pay $1 to increase willingness-to-pay for its product from $3 to $7. It would still be at a competitive disadvantage. But it is worthwhile for a supplier (at least if cautious) to pay the $1 to increase this willingness-to-pay and thereby level the playing field. It gains by creating 6 Core calculations for this and subsequent examples can be found in Appendix A in the online companion to this paper. more 'equal' competition among the firms. 7 This may be at least one effect of a brandedingredient strategy in practice. 8 The next example involves strategic moves by more than one player. 9 The structure of this cooperative game comes from Postlewaite and Rosenthal [22, 1974] . We see that analysis of the second-stage, cooperative games yields an induced noncooperative game, which is the Battle of the Sexes (Figure 2. 3). Here then, unlike Example 2.1, finding the best strategy reduces to a game problem, not a decision problem. If firm 1 thinks that firm 2 won't innovate, then its best strategy is to innovate (and vice versa).
Also, both firms may innovate, and lose overall, if each thinks the other won't. Buyers will win in this case. The two examples also differ in terms of efficiency. In Example 2.2, the efficient outcome is when one firm innovates and the other doesn't. The (net) value created is then $7 + $7 + $4 − $5 = $13, as opposed to $12 when neither innovates and $11 when both innovate.
The efficient outcome can therefore arise in this game, at least if we look at the two (purestrategy) Nash equilibria. By contrast, in Example 2.1 we saw that the supplier might optimally choose the branded-ingredient strategy. This is inefficient-it costs $1 and does not increase the total (gross) value. In Section 5 we give a general biform analysis of the efficiency or inefficiency of strategies. We prove that three conditions on a biform gameAdding Up, No Externalities, and No Coordination-are sufficient for the outcome to be efficient. (In getting to this result, we also give some additional specific examples of biform games.) This analysis gives a general way of doing a kind of 'audit' of business strategies-if modelled as biform games-to investigate their efficiency properties.
In Section 6, we conclude with a discussion of some conceptual aspects of the paper.
Related Models
The biform model is related to the two-stage models that are common in the game-theoretic industrial organization (IO) literature. Typically, these models are purely noncooperative.
Firms first make strategic choices that define a resulting noncooperative subgame, in which they then set prices and thereby compete for customers. Shapiro [24, 1989] uses this set-up to give a taxonomy of a wide range of IO models. A similar formulation is also central to Sutton's [31, 1991] theory of market structure.
The difference between these models and the biform model is in the treatment of the second stage. We have cooperative rather than noncooperative second-stage games, for two related reasons, both mentioned in the Introduction. First, the cooperative model addresses directly the question of the power of the different players (implied by the firststage strategic choices). This is the central question of a number of frameworks in the business-strategy literature. (We've already mentioned Porter [21, 1980] , and can add the Imitation-Substitution-Holdup-Slack framework of Ghemawat [7, 1991] , and the framework in Spulber [27, 2004, Chapter 7] , among others.) Second, the cooperative model embodies an 'institution-free' concept of competition. 10 This is clear in the examples above. In Example 2.1, we didn't say whether the firms set prices that buyers must take or leave, or whether the buyers name prices. Nor did we specify how the supplier and the firms interact.
The prices we mentioned were the consequences of free-form competition among the players.
The same was true of Example 2.2-both the firms and the buyers were free to negotiate.
Of course, these two features of the cooperative approach-the direct analysis of power and 10 Aumann [3, 1985, p.53] writes that "the core expresses the idea of unbridled competition." the free-form modelling-are related. The free-form modelling ensures that the power of a player comes solely from the structure of the second-stage game, and not from any procedural assumptions. A good (first-stage) strategy is one that creates a favorable (second-stage) structure for that player, in accordance with our conception of business strategy.
Two-stage models are used in the economics of organizations; see, in particular, Grossman and Hart [9, 1986] and Hart and Moore [10, 1990] . Both these papers have a noncooperative first stage and a cooperative second stage, just as we have.
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But then the approaches diverge, reflecting the different contexts being studied. In particular, GrossmanHart (resp. Hart-Moore) use the Shapley Value (resp. the Nash Bargaining Solution) to say how players who jointly create some value might agree to divide it. The difference is more than a 'technical' one. For example, the Core and Shapley Value can give very different predictions. 12 The Shapley Value (and Nash Bargaining Solution) always gives a determinate answer, whereas, by definition, the Core does so only when competition is determinate.
Next, we mention briefly other work that applies cooperative game theory to business strategy. In an earlier paper ( [5, 1996] ), we proposed using cooperative theory-the Core in particular-to give foundations for business-strategy frameworks. Stuart [29, 2001 ] summarizes some applications different from the ones we present in the current paper. MacDonald and Ryall [14, 2002] , [15, 2004] generate results based on the minimum and maximum values a player can get in the Core, and relate these results to business strategy. Lippman and Rumelt [13, 2003b] examine differences between cooperative game theory and general-or partial-equilibrium price theory, and discuss the benefits of the first as a basis for businessstrategy research. (They consider several cooperative solution concepts apart from the Corethe Shapley Value, the Nash Bargaining Solution, and the Nucleolus.) Adner and Zemsky [1, 2004] employ some cooperative concepts in analyzing factors affecting the sustainability of competitive advantage. Two recent textbooks on strategy (Oster [19, 1999] and Spulber [27, 2004] ) use ideas from cooperative theory. 13 Finally, we mention work by Makowski and 11 To be quite precise, Grossman-Hart start with a noncooperative second-stage game, from which they then define an associated cooperative game. 12 A case in point is monopoly, where the seller chooses capacity in the first stage, and the second stage is a cooperative game between seller and buyers. See Stuart [30, 2006] . 13 For an application to the field of operations management, see Anupindi, Bassok, and Zemel [2, 2001] , who employ a hybrid noncooperative-cooperative model similar to a biform game.
Ostroy ( [16, 1994] , [17, 1995] ), which, while formally in the general-equilibrium setting, was a very important influence on this and our earlier paper ( [5, 1996] ). (We say more about this connection in Section 5.)
General Formulation
We now give the general definition of a biform game. Some notation: Given a set X, let P(X) denote the power set of X, i.e., the set of all subsets of X. Also, write N = {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 4.1 An n-player biform game is a collection
where:
(a) for each i = 1, . . . , n, S i is a finite set;
(b) V is a map from S 1 × · · · × S n to the set of maps from P(N) to the reals, with
The set N is the set of players. Each player i chooses a strategy s i from strategy set S i .
The resulting profile of strategies
is the value created by the subset A of players, given that the players chose the strategies s 1 , . . . , s n . (As usual, we require V (s 1 , . . . , s n )(∅) = 0.) Finally, the number α i is player i's confidence index. Roughly speaking, it indicates how well player i anticipates doing in the resulting cooperative games. The precise way the indices α i are used, and a justification of the indices, are given below.
We note that the strategy sets S 1 , . . . , S n can, of course, come from a general extensiveform game, so that the definition of a biform game is certainly not restricted to a simultaneousmove first-stage game. 14 14 Also, incomplete information about the characteristic functions V could be incorporated (along standard lines) by adding first-stage moves by Nature that (along with the players' choices s 1 , . . . , s n ) determine
superadditive) if the cooperative game V (s) is inessential (resp. superadditive) for each
The biform model is a strict generalization of both the strategic-form noncooperative, and TU cooperative, game models. Formally, write an n-player strategic-form noncooperative game as a collection (S 1 , . . . , S n ; π 1 , . . . , π n ), where the sets S i are as above and, for each i, player i's payoff function π i maps S to the reals. The following two remarks are then immediate:
There is a natural bijection between the subclass of n-player biform games (S 1 , . . . , S n ; V ; α 1 , . . . , α n ) that are inessential and superadditive, and the class of n-player strategic-form noncooperative games (S 1 , . . . , S n ; π 1 , . . . , π n ).
There is a natural bijection between the subclass of n-player biform games (S 1 , . . . , S n ; V ; α 1 , . . . , α n ) in which the sets S i are singletons, and the class of n-player TU cooperative games.
We now turn to the analysis of a biform game (S 1 , . . . , S n ; V ; α 1 , . . . , α n ), and adopt the following procedure: See, e.g., Owen [20, 1995, pp.145-147] for definitions of inessential and superadditive games. 16 We assume that for each s ∈ S, the Core of V (s) is nonempty. See Section 6a. representation, but we show that this axiom is implied by our cooperative game context, so the structure of a biform game (S 1 , . . . , S n ; V ; α 1 , . . . , α n ) is a consistent whole. In Section 6d, we comment further on how the confidence indices represent the players' subjective views of the game.
Efficiency and Business Strategy
We now give some more examples of biform games, beyond those in Section 2. The examples, like the earlier ones, show how to analyze business-strategy ideas using a biform game. They also lead to a general analysis of the efficiency and inefficiency of business strategies.
We start with some notation and a definition. Write N\{i} for the set {1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , n} of all players except i.
Definition 5.1 Fix a biform game (S 1 , . . . , S n ; V ; α 1 , . . . , α n ), and a strategy profile s ∈ S.
Then the number
is called player i's added value in the cooperative game V (s).
In words, player i's added value is the difference, in the given cooperative game, between the overall value created by all the players, and the overall value created by all the players except i. It is, in this sense, what player i adds to the value of the game. This is the standard cooperative-game concept of marginal contribution. Here we use the "added value" terminology from our [5, 1996] . 18 The following well-known observation is immediate, and will be used below.
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Lemma 5.1 Fix a biform game (S 1 , . . . , S n ; V ; α 1 , . . . , α n ), a strategy profile s ∈ S, and suppose that the Core of V (s) is nonempty. Then if Proof. Given an allocation x ∈ R n and T ⊆ N, write x(T ) = P j∈T x j . Fix some i, and note that the Core conditions x(N) = V (s)(N) and x(N\{i}) ≥ V (s)(N\{i}) imply 18 We do so for the same reason as there: One frequently sees the term "added value" in business-strategy writing, and the usage fits with the formal definition above. 19 See, e.g, Moulin [18, 1995, Remark 2.3] . 20 Different formalisms aside, the example is essentially the same as Example 1 in Makowski-Ostroy [16, 1994] , which they kindly say was prompted by discussions with one of us.
There are three firms, each with one unit to sell at $0 cost. There are two buyers, each interested in one unit of product from some firm. Firm 1 alone has a strategic choice, which is whether or not to engage in negative advertising. If it doesn't, then each buyer has a willingness-to-pay of $2 for each firm's product. If it does, then willingness-to-pay for its own product is unchanged, but that for firm 2's and 3's products falls to $1. This is the opposite of a differentiation strategy, where a firm creates added value for itself by raising willingness-to-pay for its product (perhaps at some cost to it). Here, firm 1 creates added value by lowering willingness-to-pay for its rivals' products. Notice that the strategy is inefficient: it shrinks the overall value created from $4 to $3. 2 will also fit in.) We start with some definitions. As usual, we write S −i for The game satisfies No Externalities (NE) if for each i = 1, . . . , n; r i , s i ∈ S i ; and
The game satisfies No Coordination (NC) if for each i = 1, . . . , n; r i , s i ∈ S i ; and
The Adding Up condition says that in each second-stage cooperative game, the sum of the players' added values is equal to the overall value created in that game. (This is just the condition of Lemma 5.1 applied to each second-stage game.) The No Externalities condition says that each player's strategic choice does not affect the value that the remaining players can create (without that player). The No Coordination condition says that when one player switches strategy, the sign of the effect on the overall value created is independent of the other players' strategic choices.
We need two additional (obvious) definitions: A profile of strategies s ∈ S in a biform game will be called a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium if it is a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium of the induced noncooperative game. (This is the noncooperative game induced as in Section 5. That is, given a profile r ∈ S, we assign each player i a payoff equal to the α i : (1 − α i ) weighted average of the upper and lower endpoints of the projection onto the ith coordinate axis of the Core of the cooperative game V (r).) A strategy profile s ∈ S will be called efficient if it solves max r∈S V (r)(N).
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We can now state and prove two results on efficiency in biform games.
Lemma 5.2 Consider a biform game (S 1 , . . . , S n ; V ; α 1 , . . . , α n ) satisfying AU and NE, and that for each r ∈ S, the game V (r) has a nonempty Core. Then a strategy profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
for every r i ∈ S i .
Proof. By Lemma 5.1, AU implies that for each r ∈ S, the Core of V (r) consists of a single point, in which each player i receives V (r)(N) − V (r)(N\{i}). Therefore, a profile s is a Nash equilibrium iff for each i,
for every r i ∈ S i . But NE implies that
for every r i ∈ S i . Thus, inequality (5.2) holds if and only if inequality (5.1) holds.
Proposition 5.1 Consider a biform game (S 1 , . . . , S n ; V ; α 1 , . . . , α n ) satisfying AU, NE, and NC, and that for each r ∈ S, the game V (r) has a nonempty Core. Then if a strategy profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium, it is efficient.
Proof. Write
NC and inequality (5.1) in Lemma 5.2 together imply that each pair of terms on the righthand side of this equation is non-negative, from which V (s)(N) ≥ V (r)(N).
Proposition 5.2 Consider a biform game (S 1 , . . . , S n ; V ; α 1 , . . . , α n ) satisfying AU and NE, and that for each r ∈ S, the game V (r) has a nonempty Core. Then if a strategy profile s ∈ S is efficient, it is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We are given that V (s)(N) ≥ V (r)(N) for every r ∈ S, so certainly inequality (5.1) in Lemma 5.2 holds. Thus the profile s is a Nash equilibrium.
Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 provide, respectively, conditions for any Nash-equilibrium profile of strategies to be efficient and for any efficient profile of strategies to be a Nash equilibrium.
They can thus be viewed as game-theoretic analogs to the First and Second Welfare Theorems of general-equilibrium theory. Both Proposition 5.1 and 5.2 are closely related to results in Makowski-Ostroy ( [16, 1994] , [17, 1995] ), as we'll discuss below. First, though, we give some intuition for the results, and also tie them back to our earlier examples of business strategies.
For some intuition, note that Lemma 5.2 shows that AU and NE ensure a kind of 'social alignment.' Under AU and NE, a player's payoff increases if and only if the overall value created (the 'pie') increases. In the presence of such social alignment, NC then ensures there is a unique equilibrium.
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(If either AU or NE does not hold, then there can be multiple equilibria even under NC.)
Next, back to our earlier examples: Start with Example 2.1 (the branded-ingredient game). In the status-quo second-stage game, the supplier has an added value of $8, and firm 1 has an added value of $6 (firm 2 and the buyers have zero added value). The overall value is $8, so AU fails. (We could equally have looked at the branded-ingredient second-stage game.) NE holds: Only the supplier has a strategic choice, and the value created without the supplier is constant-at $0-regardless of which strategy the supplier follows. Finally, it is easy to see that NC is automatically 24 We are grateful to a referee for providing this intuition. satisfied in any game where only one player has a strategic choice. 25 We conclude that the possible inefficiency in this game (which we already noted in Section 2) comes from the failure of AU. In plain terms, there is a bargaining problem between the supplier and firm 1 over the $6 of value that must be divided between them. To do better in this bargaining, the supplier may well adopt a strategy (the branded-ingredient strategy) that decreases the pie.
In Example 5.1 (the negative-advertising game), it is immediate from our earlier analysis that AU is satisfied. NC is satisfied for the same reason as in Example 2.1 (only firm 1 has a strategic choice). But NE fails: The value created by firm 2, firm 3, and the two buyers is $4 when firm 1 chooses the status-quo strategy, but changes to $2 when firm 1 chooses the negative-advertising strategy. Again, the outcome is inefficient. No to Yes, the overall value falls from $6 to $5 when players 2 and 3 are both playing No, but rises from $6 to $9 when players 2 and 3 are both playing Yes. There is an inefficient Nash equilibrium (No, No, No) . Note that the efficient profile (Yes, Yes, Yes) is also a Nash equilibrium, as Proposition 5.2 says it must be. We see how the general results enable us to identify the source of the inefficiency of the business strategy in each of our examples. We also know that if a biform model of a business strategy satisfies our three conditions, then we'll get efficiency. Of course, our examples are meant only to be suggestive of how one might model many other business strategies as biform games. But we now have a general way of doing a kind of 'audit' of any business strategy-if modelled as a biform game-to discover its efficiency properties. 26 Here is one more example, just to 'redress the balance,' since we've only given one example of efficiency so far (Example 2.2). This time, AU, NE, and NC will all hold. Example 5.3 (A Repositioning Game) Consider the biform game depicted in Figure   5 .4. There are three firms, each with one unit to sell. There are two identical buyers, 25 This is what we want, of course. The possibility of inefficiency due to coordination issues should arise only when at least two players have (non-trivial) choices. 26 In our [6, 2006] , we use the same efficiency analysis to frame some of the ideas in the corporate-strategy literature.
each interested in one unit of product from some firm. Under the status quo, the firms have the costs, and the buyers have the willingness-to-pay numbers, on the upper branch.
Firm 2 has the possibility of repositioning as shown by its vertical bar on the lower branch.
Specifically, it can spend $1 to raise 'quality' (willingness-to-pay) and lower cost as shown.
Along the status-quo branch, the overall value is $14. Each firm's added value is $0; each buyer's added value is $7. Along the repositioning branch, the overall value is $15 ($16 minus the $1 repositioning cost). Firm 2's added value is $1; firm 1's and 3's added values are $0; each buyer's added value is $7. AU is satisfied, as clearly are NE and NC. By
Proposition 5.1, we know that firm 2 must optimally make the efficient choice of the lower branch, as indeed it will, to net $1. This is a simple biform model of a (re)positioning strategy. Note that on the lower branch, firm 2 still doesn't have either the lowest cost or the highest quality among the three firms. But it does command the largest gap between quality and cost. This is the source of its added value.
Some further comments on Propositions 5.1 and 5.2: First, note that Table 5 .1 establishes the independence of the AU, NE, and NC conditions. It is possible for any two to hold, but not the third. 27 Next, we emphasize that the efficiency conditions in Proposition 5.1 are sufficient, not necessary. For instance, in Example 2.2, the (pure) Nash equilibria were efficient (as we noted). But it is easily checked that AU and NC fail (NE holds). 28 This 27 It is easy to prove that if in a two-player game AU and NE are satisfied, then so is NC. This is why we needed three players to get a failure of NC alone (Example 5.2). 28 The same example shows that it's also true that the conditions of Proposition 5.2 aren't necessary. Both efficient profiles are Nash equilibria, despite the failure of AU.
said, the conditions do seem 'tight.' To maintain sufficiency, none of them can be left out in Proposition 5.1, as our examples showed, and we do not see how they could be weakened in general.
Finally, we note the considerable debt we owe to Makowski-Ostroy ( [16, 1994] , [17, 1995] ). [25, 1969] , [26, 1971] ).
Stuart [28, 1997] proves nonemptiness of the Core for a class of three-way assignment games (think of suppliers, firms, and buyers) that satisfy a local additivity condition. 30 Next, we observe that a biform model can restore nonemptiness to at least one scenario 29 Our [6, 2006] contains more details on the relationship to M-O. 30 Example 2.1 is a three-way assignment game, and Examples 5. Arguably, finding an empty Core in a model is a 'positive' finding, telling us something important about the instability of the situation being studied. This seems true of the example of nonemptiness above, though we also showed a way to avoid emptiness. Interestingly, in our biform resolution, the instability of the empty core is replaced by a kind of strategic instability: Each firm will want to be the one to pay $ε, hoping the other won't and thereby netting $(8 − ε). But both might end up losing overall. The approach in von Neumann and Morgenstern [33, 1944] was to start with a noncooperative game, which does have actions, of course, and to define an induced cooperative game from it. They then had to make a specific assumption about how the players outside A would behave. (They assumed minimax behavior.
31 ) The biform model avoids this difficulty by simply positing that each strategy profile in the first-stage noncooperative game leads to a different, and independently specified, second-stage cooperative game. The quantity v(A) is then a function of the first-stage strategic choices of all the players-including, in particular, the choices of players outside A. But this dependence is without prejudice, so to speak.
There is no built-in assumption of minimax or any other kind of behavior. 32 31 Define v(A) to be the maximin payoff of A in the two-person zero-sum game in which the players are A and the complement of A, and the payoff to A from a pair of strategies is the sum of the payoffs to the players in A from those strategies. In effect, von Neumann-Morgenstern imagine that the players in A 'assume the worst' about the players outside A. 32 Zhao [34, 1992] and Ray and Vohra [23, 1997] have interesting alternative proposals for how to make what the players in subset A can achieve depend in a 'neutral' way on what the complementary players do. Unlike us, they derive cooperative games from noncooperative games. Also, their models are one-stage not two-stage. 33 That definition was restricted to subsets A = N \{i}. But it generalizes in the obvious way to other d. Interpretation of the Confidence Index The biform model makes no prediction about how the value created at the second stage will be divided, beyond saying it must be in accordance with the Core. It does say that players form views, as represented by their confidence indices, as to how much value they will get.
Sometimes the confidence indices will play a small role. In particular, under AU, the Core consists of a unique point (Lemma 5.1), in which case the division of value is independent of the indices. In Example 2.1, the supplier's confidence index played a big role-determining whether it played the status-quo or branded-ingredient strategy.
We can think of the confidence indices as describing the players' views on how good they think they are at dealing with negotiation 'intangibles' like persuasion, bluffing, holding out, If it does for each second-stage game, we can say that the players' confidence indices are "mutually consistent." If not, they are "mutually inconsistent," and in at least one secondstage game, one or more players would definitely end up with an outcome different from that anticipated. Appendix B shows how mutual consistency can be achieved, if desired. But we stress that there is no logical or conceptual difficulty with the inconsistent case, which is also natural given the subjectivity of the players' views of the game.
subsets-simply require that V (s)(A) be independent of the s j for j / ∈ A.
